Reducing rent seeking by providing wide public service. by Glazer, Amihai & Proost, Stef
 










Energy, Transport and Environment 
 
 
Center for Economic Studies 




November 2010 Reducing Rent Seeking by Providing Wide
Public Service
Amihai Glazer










A winning coalition which sets policy cannot always ensure that
members of the coalition will be the ones getting benets. Dierent
jurisdictions (including members of the winning coalition) may then
engage in costly rent seeking. Maximizing the welfare of the win-
ning coalition may therefore require providing services to jurisdictions
which are not members of the winning coalition, thereby reducing rent
seeking by members of the winning coalition. The paper shows how
this mechanism can generate insucient supply of public services, and
oers another explanation for the use of co-funding requirements by
the central government.
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11 Introduction
A standard story of politics has a majority provide services to its members,
oering little to members of the minority. Yet we often observe that gov-
ernment provides some services to almost everyone. An early example is the
penny post, introduced in Britain in 1840, which charged a uniform penny for
carriage and delivery of mail between any two places in the United Kingdom
of Great Britain and Ireland, regardless of distance. For another example,
consider bus services in Flanders, Belgium. By law, all citizens have the right
to be served by a bus stop at a maximum of 0.5 km from their homes. As
bus service is provided by a government company, government subsidizes this
service. Other regions in the European Union have similar policies. In some,
the monopoly supplier must oer a specied frequency, nanced by cross
subsidies from other regions or other customers; provision of telecommunica-
tions in rural areas is one example. Singapore imposes a similar obligation:
\To protect commuters, the PTC [Public Transport Council] ...imposes the
Universal Service Obligation (USO) upon bus companies; requiring them to
provide a comprehensive network of scheduled bus services to within 400
meter radius of any development with a specied minimum level of daily
passenger demand. Such scheduled bus services run on predetermined routes
and cannot charge fares higher than the fares approved in accordance with
the fare review mechanism" (http://www.ptc.gov.sg/services.asp).
Of course, some private rms also oer universal service. Think of FedEx
and UPS for delivery of packages, and cell phone providers in Europe. But
here we shall concentrate on the public sector, oering one explanation for
why voters or elected ocials may favor universal service, even when it vio-
lates a standard cost-benet analysis.
We argue that when the winning coalition cannot or does not fully specify
who will win valuable services from a central government, dierent jurisdic-
tions will engage in costly rent-seeking activities to win the service. The level
of rent seeking declines with the number of jurisdictions that will be oered
service. Universal service, or wide service more generally, can benet the
majority coalition by reducing the amount members of the coalition spend
on rent seeking. Though our paper does not predict universal universalism,
it does show conditions under which universalism can occur, and more gen-
erally shows that limiting service to members of the winning coalition is a
special case. The paper shows how this mechanism can give rise to subopti-
mal supply of public services, and also oers another explanation for the use
2of co-funding requirements by the federal government.
2 Literature
2.1 Universalism
The literature examines two extreme forms of winning coalitions. One ap-
proach, introduced by Riker (1962), predicts the existence of minimum win-
ning coalitions|why should the agenda setter, or for that matter any member
of the majority, oer anything to the minority. The other extreme examines
conditions under which policies will win the support of very large majorities,
with benets going to almost all legislators. Weingast (1979), Shepsle and
Weingast (1981), and Grofman (1984) show that legislators operating under
a \veil of ignorance" (they do not know which coalitions will form in the fu-
ture) will adopt a norm of universalism that calls for all legislators to benet
from pork barrel projects. From this perspective, universalism amounts to
an insurance policy for risk-averse legislators (Shepsle and Weingast 1981).
Costs of drafting policy can aect the policies a legislator proposes, by induc-
ing him to introduce policies a large majority of legislators support (Glazer
and McMillan 1992), or by proposing policies which other legislators would
later not want to amend (Glazer and McMillan 1990).
An economic, rather than political, explanation for wide service relies
on network externalities. Network eects arise when consumption by one
consumer increases the benets obtained by other consumers. For example,
the greater the number of people who own a phone, the easier it is for a
user to contact other people. Or, the more people use Android phones,
the easier it is for any user to get advice from other users on how to use the
device. For governmentally provided goods, network externalities can appear
for additional reasons. Universal postal service may bond the country (New
York Times, August 9, 2009). Adverse selection, as in insurance markets,
may make it dicult to limit coverage.
In one sense, we too have a network eect|the greater the number of ju-
risdictions given service, the greater the net benet to each. But our network
eect arises from the benets that arise when districts compete less intensely
to obtain the service, rather than from more districts getting service.
32.2 Incomplete targeting of benets
Much literature supposes that the winning coalition in a legislature can fully
specify policy, stating for example, which city will get what allocation for
mass transit. But such specicity is often absent. Consider the United States.
Porter and Walsh (2006) cite estimates of earmarked spending; one estimate
is of $47.4 billion in 2005, and another estimate is of only $27.3 billion in 2005.
The non-partisan Annenberg Political Fact Check (2007) reports pork-barrel
spending, where legislation species spending in a legislator's jurisdiction, at
about only one percent of federal spending.
Consistent with these data, McCubbins, Noll, and Weingast (1987 and
1989) suppose that the winning coalition's ability to set policy is limited.
Instead, the winning coalition may adopt institutional rules that aect an
agency's future decisions. One reason a legislator may prefer not to specify
policy is that he is unsure about which location or which exact project would
generate the most benets to him. An additional uncertainty at the time the
legislation is adopted is which special interest, or which group within the
legislator's jurisdiction, the legislator would want to benet. Or, though
the legislators may want to specify policies, agency ocials may not follow,
or they may misinterpret, legislative directives. A cost of reducing agency
discretion is that a small error in drafting legislation (say mis-spelling the
name of a city) may mean that a member of the winning coalition will get no
service at all; delegation to an agency allows for correcting such errors. Or
the denitions of geographical areas or of beneciaries may change, so that
it is dicult to specify recipients. For example, a congressman who antic-
ipates redistricting may not know which geographic area he will represent,
and so cannot specify the recipient. Moreover, specifying by law individual-
ized benets is often considered as violating constitutional provisions. Once
everyone understands that everybody else will restrict himself from propos-
ing individualized benets, it becomes rational for each individual to stay in
this restrictive set of strategies, making this type of institutional behavior
enforced (Myerson 2009).
2.3 Rent seeking
Rent seeking is often used in analyses of politics (Tullock 1967; Krueger
1974; Posner 1975; Bhagwati 1982; Buchanan, Tollison, and Tullock 1980;
Tollison 1982). Most of the literature discusses rent seeking that benets
4rms or special interest groups. But the concept also applies to transfers of
wealth to politicians or to their constituents: a politician, for instance, may
lobby for federal funds to his district. Economists consider the problem a
serious one. Tullock (1967, 1980) shows that in competitive rent seeking the
aggregate resources devoted to pursuing redistributions of wealth can equal
the value of the rents to be distributed. In a pioneering paper Krueger (1974)
estimates the costs of rent seeking associated with trade restrictions at 15%
of GNP in Turkey in 1968 and 7.3% in India in 1964. In a direct calculation
of spending by rms entering a lottery for cellular telephone licenses, Hazlett
and Michaels (1993) nd that rms spend about a third of the value of the
licenses on rent seeking.
Buchanan (1980) and others argue that constitutional restrictions on
spending and taxes are necessary to reduce the resources consumed in seeking
transfers of wealth. We will argue that universal service can limit rent-seeking
eorts.1
We make use of the results about contest theory given by Clark and Riis
(1998). But we dier in several ways from them and from others studying
rent seeking. First, we look at the welfare not of the contest organizer or of
the rent-seekers, but at the welfare of a subset|a majority of legislators or
the pivotal member of a winning coalition, all of whom will seek rents, with
additional people also seeking rents. Second, we focus not on aggregate rent
seeking, but on welfare, dened as the values of the prizes won by members
of the group, minus the tax paid to nance the service, minus their rent-
seeking eorts. Third, we have the contest designed not by some exogenous
holder of the prize, but by some of the potential rent seekers themselves.
Last, we apply rent-seeking to a question not previously addressed in that
literature|the behavior of a winning coalition under majority voting.
1Sometimes, in contrast to the problem we address, government wishes to encourage
an activity, by oering a prize that induces rent-seeking activity. Patents grants are one
example. Another example is the \Race to the Top" program of the Obama Administra-




Consider a country with an even number, N, of districts, each with one
representative in the legislature. Policy is made by majority vote, so that
at least (N=2) + 1 of the districts must benet from any policy proposal. A
policy consists of providing a service (say bus service) to s districts; the policy
decision is thus the value of s. A district's benet from service is independent
of the supply of the service to other districts. The cost of serving a district
is identical for all districts, but the benets dier by district. The aggregate
cost of providing service to s districts is C(s).
Districts are ordered from highest (index 1) to lowest (index N) value of
gross benets. As the cost of serving any district is identical, we assume that
the winning majority coalition consists of the (N=2) + 1 districts with the
highest valuation. The cost of the services is shared across all N districts;
the tax paid by the pivotal district in the winning coalition is fC(s), with
0 < f  1. For example, f could be 1=N when the costs are shared equally
over all districts. Each district pays the tax whether it receives the service
or not.
The value of service to district i is vi(i = 1;2;:::;N), with v1  v2  :::vN.
More generally, we can think that the majority can structure the policy so
that a district which is a member of the majority coalition gets at least as
great a benet from the service as does a district which is not a member of
the majority coalition, that is vi > vj if i  (N=2) + 1 and j > (N=2) + 1.
Each district can get the service or not; it does not get multiple service. The
benet vi is independent of when a district receives service and of how many
districts receive service. The valuations are common knowledge.
For some explicit results we will make more specic assumptions. The
cost of providing service to s jurisdictions is then F + cs; the ith highest
valuation is then vi = a   bi, with a and b positive parameters.
3.2 Rent seeking
We assume that though the majority sets the total budget (or sets the number
of districts to be served, s), an agency selects the districts to be served. Each
district can lobby the agency.
Consider a multi-prize contest, where s identical prizes are distributed to
6s  N districts. Our analysis applies to dierent kinds of lobbying scenarios.
A simple mechanism, the English auction, would have each district make a
bid. The agency provides service to the s highest bidders; a district which
gets service pays its bid and pays the taxes which nance aggregate spending;
a district which gets no service pays only the taxes.
A dierent formulation, which yields almost identical results, builds on
Clark and Riis (1998). Let each of the N districts simultaneously choose an
outlay (rent-seeking eort that is a sunk cost) xi  0. One of the partici-
pating districts gets the rst service oered. The remaining N   1 districts
which had not yet received service then engage in a similar game, with each
exerting rent-seeking eort; again one district is selected. The game repeats
until s districts receive service. The discount factor is 1, so that a district
does not care when it gets the service. We note that our results continue to
hold in a simultaneous game in which each district engages in rent seeking
only once, with the s districts that spent the most obtaining service.
The majority coalition chooses s to maximize the net benet (probability
of obtaining the service times the value of the service, minus rent-seeking
eorts, minus taxes to nance service) of its pivotal member. We shall sup-
pose that the pivotal member is the median one, with valuation vN=2+1. But
that is not critical to our results.
The timeline follows.
1. Nature assigns a valuation vi to each district
2. The winning coalition chooses the number, s, of districts that will get
service
3. The winning coalition chooses the number, s, of districts that will get
service
4. Each district pays the share of taxes that will nance the services to s
districts
5. Each district engages in rent seeking (repeatedly if it had not obtained
service in the previous round) to get service
6. The agency assigns service to s particular districts
7. A district i which gets service enjoys a gross benet vi
74 Results
4.1 Equilibrium benets
Consider rst lobbying as described by an English auction. Let N players
with valuations v1  v2  :::vN compete for s identical prizes. The equi-
librium is for districts 1:::s to each bid vs+1, for district s + 1 to bid an
innitesimal amount below vs+1, and for districts s + 2:::N to each bid 0.
Each of districts 1:::s gets the service, paying vs+1, and so district i's net
benet is vi   vs+1   fC(s). Districts s + 1:::N do not get service, but pay
taxes for the services others receive. This set of bids is a Nash equilibrium
because no district can gain by changing its behavior. For example, if dis-
trict s+1 bids vs+1 instead of vs+1   it would have a chance of getting the
service, but the benet from the service would equal the bid it must pay for
it. We shall make much use of the result that in equilibrium the net benet
of district i (for i = 1:::s) is vi   vi+s   fC(s).
Remarkably, though not previously noticed, the same net benets apply
for an all-pay auction. Clark and Riis (1998) show that in a contest with
N players with valuations v1  v2  :::vN competing for s identical prizes
by making (sunk) eorts, a unique equilibrium in mixed strategies exists.
Only the s + 1 districts with the highest benets spend a positive amount
on rent seeking. The expected net surplus of actively participating player
i = 1;2;:::s+1 is vi vs+1 fC(s). The expected net benets of the pivotal
member of the winning coalition, when s districts will receive service are:
vN=2+1   vs+1   fC(s): (1)
For the following, we can rely on the results of Clark and Riis (1998), or
we can view lobbying as a form of an English auction. That means that
the pivotal member would want to extend service from s to s + 1 districts if
fC(s + 1)   fC(s) < vs+1   vs+2.
Under the all-pay auction, the probability that district i wins the service
at some round or other is (see result (13) in Clark and Riis 1998)




and, for districts 2:::N




8Note that in an all-pay auction a district that is a member of the winning
coalition which votes for the policy is not sure to get the service. Thus, a
dierence between the results under an English auction and under an all-
pay auction is that the equilibrium under an English auction is ecient|the
districts that most highly value the service always get the service. In contrast,
under the all-pay auction, with positive probability a district with valuation
greater than vs+1 may not get served, whereas the district with valuation
vs+1 does get served.
Under the all-pay auction, an increase in s yields two benets to each
district in the winning coalition: it increases the probability that the district
receives service, and it reduces the equilibrium level of rent-seeking eort.
Under the English auction, only the second benet appears. Note that if
s = N, there is no rent seeking, each district obtains service, and the net
benet to district i is vi   fC(N).
For values of s < N, it is critical to note that a district's net expected
benet depends not on gross benet vi, but on the dierence between its
gross benet and that of the marginal rent-seeker. If vs+1 = vs+2, for all s,
and if s < N,then a majority district gains nothing from an increase in s.
PROPOSITION 1 The service is never supplied to fewer than N=2 + 1
districts.
PROOF: Of course, to get majority support, service must be provided to
no less than a majority of the districts, or s  N=2 + 1. For example, if s
prizes are provided, only the s + 1 players with the highest valuation seek
service, with the player indexed by s+1 enjoying zero expected benet from
engaging in rent seeking. Thus, if s < N=2 + 1, the pivotal district, indexed
by N=2 + 1 gains zero expected benet from rent seeking, but must pay a
share of aggregate costs. Thus, a proposal with s < N=2 + 1 cannot gain
majority support. .
PROPOSITION 2 The majority sets the number of districts that will get
service as
s = N if vN=2+1   fC(N) > 0 and vN=2+1   fC(N) > vN=2+1   vs+1  
fC(s) for all N=2 + 1  s  N   2
N=2 + 1  s < N if vN=2+1   vs+1   fC(s) > 0 and vN=2+1   vs+1  
fC(s) > vN=2+1   vj   fC(j) for all j > s
9s = 0 otherwise.
PROOF. The proof immediately follows from the observation that the
pivotal district's gross benet when s < N is given by (1). The pivotal
district's benet when s = N is vN=2+1   fC(N).
So for an interior solution, the number of districts s that are served sat-
ises the condition that the marginal cost to a majority member of serving
one more district equals the dierence in net benets for the next district in
line. And the majority may adopt universal service because then no district
spends anything on rent seeking.
The smaller the benet for the lower-valuing districts (districts with index
greater than N=2+1), the higher the pivotal voter's benet. First, the lower-
valuing districts will spend less on rent seeking so the pivotal district gains
a larger expected surplus vN=2+1   vs+1. Second, for some of the N districts
vi may be non-positive; they will not seek the service and so reduce the tax
cost for the pivotal district.
The observation that the net benet of the pivotal district equals the
dierence between its valuation of the service and the valuation by district
s + 1 has several implications.
Majority may favor universal service The majority may favor univer-
sal service, to eliminate the need for rent-seeking eorts. Limited service is
sub-optimal for the pivotal district if vN=2+1  vs  fC(s) < vN=2+1  fC(N)
for all s greater than N=2 + 1 and less than N, or if (C(N)   C(s))f < vs
in this range of s. A sucient condition for universal service is that all vi
are equal (so that non-universal service would exhaust benets because of
rent seeking ) and that fC(N) < vN=2+1 so that the benet of service to the
pivotal district exceeds its share of the costs of universal service.
Universal service is more attractive the more homogeneous the
districts The results imply that the benet of universal service increases
with the homogeneity of the districts, where homogeneity is measured by
the dierence between vN=2+1 and the valuations of districts with indices
higher than that. So more homogeneous societies may more frequently give
universal service not because of altruism, but to avoid rent seeking.
10Majority favors low quality of service We so far took the quality of the
service as exogenous. Rent seeking can generate an incentive for low quality
of service. To see this, let the winning coalition decide not only on how many
districts are served, but also on the quality of the service. Suppose rst that
the gross benet function is positive for all N districts, and remains positive
whatever the quality selected. Then if the majority can reduce the valuation
for all districts with index greater than N=2 + 1, the expected benet for
the pivotal district increases under non-universal service. By reducing the
valuation of these districts, the rent-seeking eorts of these districts will
decline, thereby reducing the rent-seeking eorts of the pivotal district.
In particular, consider a costless deterioration of quality which reduces
everyone's valuation by the constant k. We can represent this change with a
parallel shift of the v function. Such a shift does not change vi   vs+1, and
so does not harm the pivotal district. So even for the slightest cost saving,
the pivotal district will favor a decline in quality.2
Majority favors cost sharing In many countries, the higher-level gov-
ernment (federal, or state) nances only some of the cost of service, requiring
a district which receives service to bear a share of the cost. We shall see that
members of the majority may favor a policy which imposes cost sharing on
districts which receive service. We examine only the case where the federal
level can require a district that gets service to pay a fraction k (with k < c) of
the cost, in addition to paying its share of costs incurred in providing service
to other districts.
A value of k > 0 is equivalent to a reduction in quality, or to a reduction
of each vi by the amount k. Ignoring for the moment the tax a district pays,
such a uniform reduction in vi leaves vi vs+1 unchanged, and therefore does
not aect the expected gain of district i. But, in addition, a positive value
of k reduces the tax each district must pay the central government, and so a
positive value of k can generate higher benet to a member of the majority
coalition than does a zero value of k. 3
2Matters dier if dierent districts place dierent values on quality. Then, ignoring
costs of providing service, the pivotal member of the winning coalition would like a quality
that maximizes the dierence between his valuation of the service and the valuation by
district s + 1. If the pivotal member values quality more than do districts not members
of the winning coalition, then the pivotal member may favor an increase in quality.
3As with the analysis of quality, matters dier if the cost of raising revenue necessary
to nance cost-sharing diers across districts. If, for example, raising revenue imposes a
11This explanation for cost-sharing complements a common view that local
ocials are better informed than are central government ocials about local
conditions, so that cost-sharing induces the adoption of a project in those
districts that are most likely to benet from it (Oates 1972). A centralized
and uniform supply of services is more ecient when preferences are homoge-
neous. Under our analysis, homogeneity of preferences will induce universal
supply but for a dierent reason|it avoids large spending on rent seeking.4
Majority may prefer service to more districts than does the minor-
ity We have seen that the benet to the majority of extending service to
multiple districts lies in part in the reduction in rent seeking. The benet
to the majority need not, however, extend to all members of the minority.
Suppose some member of the minority (say district 10) values the service
at v10, which is close to zero, and that district 9 values the service at v9
which is reasonably larger than the cost to a district of expanding service,
c=N. Then if the majority expands service from district 9 to district 10, the
expected net benet to a member of the majority increases by approximately
v9 c=N > 0. But district 10 gets no net benet in equilibrium, while paying
added taxes of c=N. That is, district 10 would prefer that it would never
get service, rather than that enough districts get service so that it also has a
chance to obtain it. Service is extended over the objections of a district that
might get it.
Allocation is inecient How does behavior under rent seeking compare
to the rst-best allocation of services to the dierent districts? There are
four sources of ineciency. First the chosen level of s is always inecient
when the optimal s < N=2+1, as shown in Proposition 1. Without further
functional specication we can not claim that the number of districts served,
s, is always too high.
A second source of ineciency lies with the identity of the districts that
are served. For any s that is selected, it is always ecient to choose those
districts with the highest benets. Under rent seeking with an all-pay auc-
tion, such an allocation is not guaranteed as, in equilibrium, s + 1 districts
larger social cost in districts which belong to the minimum winning coalition, then that
coalition would oppose cost sharing.
4Cheikbossian (2008) sees a benet of decentralization in reducing rent-seeking activi-
ties across regions: under centralization, each region wishes to push the central government
for greater spending in its region, and lower spending in the other region.
12compete for s prizes so those with the highest benets are not necessarily
selected.
The third source of ineciency is obviously the rent seeking itself. It is
an unproductive sunk cost, which can be particularly large when the districts
are homogeneous. A fourth source of ineciency lies in the incentive for too
low quality.
Taxing the supply to the minority Consider a pivotal district which
who places little value on the service, and so would prefer that the service not
be provided at all. This can leave a high-valuing minority with high welfare
losses. An extreme solution to this problem is private provision organised
by the minority. Another solution is to oer public services to s < N=2 + 1
districts, but with each paying an amount exceeding the cost. The pivotal
district would then want to maximize total revenue minus total costs, and
would want to avoid the districts from engaging in rent seeking|such rent
seeking would reduce the willingness to pay by the districts that value the
service, and so would reduce revenue. The number of districts that will be
served will, however, be less than the welfare-maximizing number, as the
pivotal district votes for the the tax-revenue maximising solution so that at
this s, the value to the district is larger than the marginal cost.
4.2 Risk aversion
Some of our results will appear if rent seeking is absent but voters are risk
averse. Under the all-pay auction but not under the English auction, a
district in the majority may then fear that it will not get the service, and so
it prefers a large s.
The risk-aversion hypothesis, however, looks at vi, rather than at vi vs+1,
and therefore does not make our predictions about inecient policies. In
particular, if the vi's are all equal, then an increase in s generates no benet
to any player, unless service is universal. That diers from risk aversion.
When the rent-seeking eects we consider are important, a study which in-
terprets behavior as resulting from risk aversion may overestimate the degree
of risk aversion. For the aim of reducing rent seeking will call for extending
service beyond what risk aversion would call for.
135 Linear functions
To illustrate the results, consider linear functions, C(s) = F +cs, with c and
F positive constants, and vi = a bi. To allow for the possibility of universal
service, suppose that vN = a bN = 0. We let the cost of service be divided
equally across all districts, so that the pivotal district's tax is (F + cs)=N.
We have the following rather strong specic results.
PROPOSITION 3 Consider a linearly declining benet function and a
linear cost function. Then
 a. The pivotal district favors either service to all districts, or no service
at all.
 b. The pivotal district favors universal service if the average cost of the
service is larger than its benet.
 c. If quality can be set to reduce benets and save costs by a xed
proportion of the cost per district, and if vN = 0, then the quality
supplied will always be biased downwards by 50%.
 d.If vN = 0, the average cost of the service is lower than its value to
the pivotal district, and co-funding can be required, then the pivotal
district always favors a co-funding of 50%.
 e. If the average cost of the service is higher than the value of the service
to the pivotal district, and if the majority can require co-funding, then
the pivotal district always favors a co-funding of more than 100%, there
is no rent seeking, and only half of the socially optimal number of
districts is served.
 f. Adding the option of co-funding never reduces welfare.
PROOF: Parts a and b: If the pivotal district prefers less than universal
service, it will select s to maximize [a b(N=2+1)] [a b(s+1)] cs=N F=n.
But this maximization entails a corner solution. If b > c the pivotal district
may favor universal service; if b < c the pivotal district prefers no service at
all. If b > c and if a   b(N=2 + 1) > c + F=N, or the benet from service
exceeds average cost, it will favor universal service.
14Part c: The proof follows from simple optimization of the quality decrease
and decrease in unit cost (r) such that the net benet to the pivotal district is
maximized, given that (from part (a)) that the pivotal voter favors universal
service to all districts that value it. We look for the maximum of (a  
(b)(N=2 + 1)   r)   (c   r)n(r)=N where n() is the number of districts for
which vi   r  0. Solving a   bn   r = 0 yields n(r) = (a   r)=b, and so
r = c=2
Part d: shown in part c as r can be seen as a monetary contribution to
the central government, the result is a co-funding requirement of 50%.
Part e: Assume that the pivotal district can require a co-funding of r > c
and that it does not benet from having the service supplied to itself. If
the number of districts with vi > 0 is less than N=2 + 1 (that is, if only a
minority of districts would benet from obtaining the service), then the goal
of the majority diers from what we discussed above. Any majority that
forms would have as a member a district that does not value the service.
Under the assumption that any revenue raised is distributed equally among
all districts, the pivotal district would then want to maximize the net revenue
raised from providing the service. That is, the pivotal district could be viewed
as a monopolist providing a service at marginal cost c, and charging a price
r for it. Notice, that any price r will determine a number of districts, n(r)
that want the service at price r. The pivotal district would then want to
set s = n(r), and so no district would engage in rent seeking. In this case,
the pivotal district chooses r that maximizes total net tax revenues and this
generates the monopoly solution where only half of the optimal number of
districts get service.
Part f: Assume rst that only a minority values the service. If co-funding
at more than 100% is infeasible, the pivotal district will never favor govern-
ment providing the service. With co-funding at more than 100% feasible, the
minority districts can decide for themselves to opt for the service or not, and
so their welfare can never decrease. Assume next that the pivotal district
benets from universal service when it can not impose co-funding. With
our assumptions there is always universal service and so oversupply in the
absence of a co-funding requirement. Any co-funding rate between 0 and
100% will reduce the number of districts served, and will increase welfare
as the districts that are no longer served valued the service at less than the
marginal cost.
Regarding the welfare consequences of the choice of s, it is not necessarily
15true that if the majority chooses to supply the service to N > s > N=2 +
1 districts, it will always be supplied to excessively many districts. The
problem is that the pivotal district may decide not to oer the service because
he compares his benet with his share of taxes to nance universal service,
whereas the social eciency criterion takes the total surplus of high value
districts into account.
Figure 1 depicts the results, assuming that the xed cost is zero and that
the socially-optimal solution calls for providing the service to so districts
(with N=2 + 1 < so < N). At this optimum, the marginal cost of extending
the service, c, equals the benet, v(s), to the last district served. How does
this condition compare with our equilibrium? Note rst that it is never
optimal for the pivotal district to set s = N=2+1, because the contest would
result in the pivotal district obtaining a gross benet (b)(N=2+ 1)   (b)(s +
1) = b; the pivotal district does better under universal service which would
give it the benet a   bN=2   c. If c is uniformly distributed, so will be so,
and in this case the costs of underprovision (when so < N=2 + 1, the service
is never oered) are much larger than the costs of overprovision.
Figure 2 illustrates the eects of reduced quality. Consider a downward
shift in the benet function, with a concomitant reduction in the tax required
to nance service. As it is the benet function that will determine how many
districts seek service and starting from the initial position where r = 0 and
a bN = 0, reducing quality reduces the number of districts that want to be
served; remember that in our linear model all districts that want the service
will receive the service as the pivotal voter wants to avoid rent seeking. But
when the benet of service is 0 for the last district, a reduction in quality
reduces the costs of serving all the districts for whom vi remains positive by
more than the reduction in vi for the pivotal district.
Figure 2 can illustrate the eects of a requirement for co-funding. If
so > N=2 + 1, a co-funding requirement of r reduces the net benet of the
service to the pivotal district, reduces the number of districts served when
service is oered to all that want it, and reduces the tax paid by the pivotal
district. Increasing the co-funding requirement r beyond c does not benet
the pivotal district because the pivotal district misses the opportunity to
spread the costs of service over N districts via the general tax system.
166 Conclusion
In designing a policy, the legislators who control the policy should care not
only about the costs of the policy, or about the benets that a service would
yield to those districts which get service. When control over policy is imper-
fect, members of the minimum winning coalition should be concerned about
rent-seeking activity by all districts. That means that members of the win-
ning coalition should worry about the benets to districts excluded from the
winning coalition. The general principle is that the members of the winning
coalition benet from reducing the benets to the marginal district that seeks
service. Such reductions can take several forms. One is to provide service to
many districts|the greater the number of districts that would get service,
the smaller the benet to the marginal district that might get service, and
consequently the larger the expected benets to the infra-marginal district.
We also saw that similar eects can arise if the quality of the service is re-
duced, or if districts which get service must pay a share of the costs. To
put it dierently, the expected benet a district obtains when districts com-
pete for service depends not on the absolute benet from the service, but on
the comparative advantage a district enjoys, or on the dierence between its
benets and what other districts get.
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197 Notation
C(s) Cost of providing service to s districts
f Fraction of total service costs incurred by any one district in the majority
coalition
N Total number of districts
Pi Probability that district i obtains service
s Number of districts that obtain service




















FIGURE 2 Effects of quality decrease or cofunding
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